Wanted: Drug Pimp/Key Opinion Leader

Daniel Carlat from the Carlat Psychiatry Blog received an invitation to the key opinion leader club from the good people at Schering-Plough. The company wanted him to read their slides to other physicians in order to promote their brand spanikn' new antipsychotic/mood stabilizer Saphris (asenapine). Because, of course, if he reads the slides, they are more credible than if read by one of those sleazy drug reps; it's so much more classy and believable if an "independent" psychiatrist reads the company's marketing copy.

Carlat posted the documents used in the attempt to recruit him (cover letter, speaker bureau arrangement, pimp, er, speaker fees) Everyone should read them. Speakers are only allowed to rake in $170,000 of dirty money through this program. I suppose anything more would make them look like shameless drug pimps. But if you were to take, say, $50k for your "educational" services, that would be totally acceptable, right? I hereby nominate anyone who accepts Schering-Plough's generous offer for the much coveted Golden Goblet Award.

What's the deal with this Saphris drug, anyway? One neuropsychologist reviewed the data and found that it promises to be yet another also-ran atypical antipsychotic, at best. Some have also raised questions of whether the drug deserved FDA approval at all. Get ready for some ghostwritten articles that present the evidence surrounding Saphris in a ridiculously biased manner, for key opinion leaders to travel to conferences extolling its virtues, and for the rest of the usual marketing tricks.

Will Pharma's (Tax) Free Speech Be Limited?

Dan Neil has an absolutely marvelous column in the LA Times about pharma's bitching/moaning regarding increased regulation of its advertising and its potential loss of tax writeoffs associated with drug ads. It's nice to know that when I'm watching a misleading advertisement for, say, Cymbalta or Abilify, pharma is writing off the advertising cost on its tax bill. Big Pharma's legal consultants have weighed in for years on this topic, using such terms as "starkly unconstitutional," "censorship," "plainly violates the First Amendment", and adding that taking away the tax deduction is "Draconian punishment" - see this document from the pharma-friendly Washington Legal Foundation and just try to keep a straight face.

Neil writes that:

Currently in draft form, these [FDA] rules would dramatically raise the legal bar for risk disclosure. Not only would advertisements have to fully explicate serious side effects, the nature of adverse reactions, the risk of dependence, dangerous drug interactions and so on, but all of that would also have to be communicated in the most direct, unambiguous and, if you will, artless form possible.

And, picking some of the low-hanging fruit, Neil goes on to describe two of my most hated ads:

Consider, the current 75-second spot for Abilify, a powerful antipsychotic drug marketed as a potential add-on to antidepressants. At the 33-second mark, the warnings start: "thoughts of suicide," "elderly dementia patients . . . have an increased risk of death or stroke," "uncontrollable muscle movements [that] may become permanent" and so on. The astonishing thing is that Bristol-Myers Squibb spent more than $35 million in the first quarter alone to market this witch's brew.

Seizures, death, trouble swallowing. Jeez, I get depressed just watching the ad. Maybe that's the idea.

Another wonder drug -- as in, I wonder if this will kill me? -- is Wyeth's Pristiq. Again, the potential adverse reactions are alarming: "Antidepressants can increase suicidal thoughts and behaviors in children, teens and young adults," the ad says. "May cause or worsen high blood pressure, high cholesterol and glaucoma."

Scary stuff. And yet, the FDA might say, not scary enough. Because the voice-over rambles on with a litany of potential side effects, some of which is quite hard to follow, the commercial seems to violate the FDA's constraint that advertisements not overwhelm viewers' "cognitive load." On a more prosaic level, the imagery of this suffering woman suddenly redeemed by this medication, so that now she's playing with her family at the park, seems to vastly over-promise relief.

Vastly over-promising relief, indeed. Watching Congress, the FDA, the pharma-funded academic hired guns, and lawyers on these issues will make for an entertaining spectator sport. Not nearly as engrossing as watching the DSM-V drama unfold (1, 2, 3), but still a lot cheaper than going to a Yankees game.

Abilify Marketing Blitz: Atypical Antipsychotics Gone Wild

"The results are extremely unimpressive; they just squeak by," says Massachusetts psychiatrist Daniel Carlat, editor of the respected Carlat Psychiatry Report. For a clinician or a patient's family, the difference between those on Abilify and those who took a placebo "would be hard to actually see," he adds.

Dr. Carlat is referring to the comparison between Abilify and placebo in the treatment of depression, a topic I have discussed in depth previously (1 , 2 , 3, 4). The above quote comes from a Melissa Healy piece in the Los Angeles Times that throws a damper on Abilify's parade through depression.

Another Melissa Healy piece from the LA Times starts off as follows:

About a year ago, patients began trooping into the office of UCLA psychiatrist Andrew Leuchter, asking whether an antipsychotic drug called Abilify "might be right for them." Few appeared to be delusional, plagued by hallucinations or suffering fearsome mood swings. Mostly, they were depressed or anxious, and frustrated by the pace of their recovery.

Leuchter wondered what was up: Depressed patients didn't usually seek out drugs used to quell psychiatry's most disturbing symptoms.

What was up, he soon discovered, was spending on a new advertising campaign touting Abilify as an "add-on" treatment for depression. For the first time since the arrival of a new generation of antipsychotic medications -- six drugs called the "atypicals" because they work differently from the earlier generation of antipsychotic drugs -- the makers of one, Abilify, had been granted the legal right to market to a vast new population of patients beyond those with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.

Here's Bristol-Myers Squibb's advertisement for the drug:



This is classic. BMS notes that two-thirds of depressed patients who take antidepressants will still have symptoms after a course of antidepressants. And they have a point: Antidepressants ain't exactly miracle pills. So the commercial implies that Abilify must be really helpful... But if patients add Abilify to their treatment regimen, then only about 25% of them experience remission of depressive symptoms. Isn't it a bit strange that Abilify is appealing to the two-thirds of patients who still have depressive symptoms after taking an antidepressant and offering them a treatment that will lead to remission for only one-quarter of them? Of course, no studies have compared adding Abilify to adding another antidepressant, adding psychotherapy, adding an exercise routine, or adding anything except a placebo. Oh, and given that Abilify led to remission of symptoms in about 25% of patients, while placebo led to remission in about 15% of patients, um, that's a pretty small difference. And keep in mind that the studies were designed in a manner that was almost sure to find a benefit for Abilify, as I have noted previously.

If Abilify was generally benign, then a relatively small benefit over placebo is acceptable. But, as I mentioned previously, the side effects are troubling. I took issue with a BMS-funded journal article/puff piece that tried to spin side effect data on Abilify:

The authors note that "adjunctive aripiprazole is relatively well-tolerated in patients with MDD." Relatively? Relative to what -- being hit with a baseball bat repeatedly? They note that akathisia occurred in 25% of patients on Abilify compared to 4% of patients on placebo. Restlessness: 12% vs. 2%; insomnia: 8% vs. 3%; fatigue: 8% vs. 4%; blurred vision: 6% vs 1%. The authors report that akathisia resolved in 52% of patients by the end of the study, which would also mean that for 48% of patients with akathisia, they were stuck with it at the end of the study. But don't worry, it's "relatively well-tolerated."

You gotta like any drug that induces akathisia at the same rate that it induces symptom remission. Psychiatrist Doug Bremner had a similar take on Abilify as showing a poor cost-benefit ratio. For a few descriptions of akathisia, see comments at this post on Furious Seasons.

Given the unimpressive scientific data regarding Abilify for depression on one hand and the drug's exploding sales on the other, I was sure glad to see a big paper such as the LA Times note that there really is a controversy here. And if Seroquel receives official FDA approval as an add-on treatment for depression, get ready for the marketing machine to reach a fever pitch. Viva Zyprexa, anyone? Melissa Healy covers the expansion of atypical antipsychotics from schizophrenia and bipolar disorder into depression in an article that y'all simply must read. I'll close with a sad-but-true quote from Yale psychiatry professor Robert Rosenheck:

The story's pretty clear, and pretty embarrassing for the profession of psychiatry, which has allowed itself to be led by marketing," says Robert Rosenheck, a psychiatrist at Yale University who has studied the effectiveness and expanded use of the atypical antipsychotics. "We know now what these companies' strategies are: The number of people with schizophrenia is limited, so the road to profitability goes through soccer moms. They need to market these drugs to ordinary people who have dissatisfactions in life.

Lamictal: Break Out the Shovel

GlaxoSmithKline, manufacturer of lamotrigine (Lamictal), the antiepileptic drug used widely for bipolar disorder, happily hid clinical trial results which found Lamictal was no better than a placebo. Given recent findings about how often pharmaceutical companies selectively push positive results to publication in medical journals while suppressing negative results, this can hardly be considered a surprise. It is nonetheless instructive to examine how the published data on Lamictal paint a much rosier picture of the drug's efficacy compared to unpublished data.

Nassir Ghaemi, a psychiatrist at Tufts University Medical Center, dug through GSK's online database of information, and found that several negative Lamictal studies (studies which failed to show a benefit for Lamictal over placebo on the primary outcome measure) were quietly residing on the site. Why did GSK post such information on their site? Not out of the goodness of their hearts; rather, because they were forced to post data about clinical trial outcomes as a result of a legal agreement. Here's what Ghaemi found in GSK's database:

Acute mania: Two studies compared lithium, Lamictal, and placebo. Both found that Lamictal did not beat a placebo. Neither study was published.

Acute bipolar depression: Three studies were conducted. All three showed negative results. Two were not published. On one study, there was a positive result for Lamictal on a secondary outcome measure, and the results of the study were written to emphasize the positive outcomes, as in stating "Lamotrigine monotherapy is an effective and well-tolerated treatment for bipolar depression."

Rapid cycling bipolar: Two studies were completed; both were negative on the primary outcome. However, one study showed favorable outcomes for Lamictal on several secondary measures. The obviously negative study was not published while the study that showed a number of benefits for Lamictal was published.

Prophylaxis (Prevention of future episodes): Two studies were conducted, both of which showed that patients on Lamictal went longer between episodes than did placebo patients. Both studies were published.

Well, I'm shocked, shocked, that GSK would simply bury a slew of negative data on their product. Who woulda thunk it? So what does this mean for Lamictal? Dr. Ghaemi was interviewed by Dr. Daniel Carlat (of Carlat Psychiatry Blog and the Carlat Psychiatry Report). There were many pieces of Ghaemi's interview that were interesting (see February 2008 issue of Carlat Psychiatry report; sorry, no link available), but the most interesting piece was:

Carlat: My understanding is that you wrote up your discovery of the negative Lamictal data and submitted the paper to some journals. What has been the response?

Ghaemi: I first submitted to JAMA because I knews they were sympathetic to this kind of critique. Their reaction was, "We already publish many papers like this; this is old news; there is nothing new here." They recommended that I send it to a psychiatric journal. So then I sent it to the American Journal of Psychiatry, but they rejected it as well, saying that they were doubtful that this type of negative publication bias was common among other companies marketing medications for bipolar disorder.

Carlat: Do you think there is much suppressed negative data about other drugs?

Ghaemi: It's very hard to get this information. Companies are not required to disclose it. And if they do publish it, they will sometimes delay publication for two or three years, and then publish it in an obscure journal that it less likely to be read.

Ghaemi also did some digging on other drugs used for bipolar disorder and found that negative studies for Seroquel and Abilify were also lurking in the unpublished zone. However, it appears that Lamictal is the worst offender of the bunch. Is it just me, or is anyone else getting flashbacks to GSK's handling of suicide data regarding its antidepressant Paxil?

Thanks to an anonymous reader for helping to track down relevant information on this and an upcoming post on this topic. The forthcoming post will deal with the misleading scientific literature on Lamictal. Key opinion leaders will likely be mentioned. The usual stuff, just on a different drug and plugging in the names of other academics who apparently deemed it acceptable to mislead their fellow physicians about the efficacy of lamotrigine. GSK worked the system expertly and it paid off.

S. Nassir Ghaemi, Arshia A. Shitzadi, Megan Filkowski (2008). Publication bias and the pharmaceutical industry: The case of lamotrigine for bipolar disorder Medscape Journal of Medicine, 10 (9), 211-211

A Month in The Life of Chuck "High Life" Nemeroff

The psychiatry world is belatedly exhibiting outrage toward a man whose ability to lure pharma cash seems to know no bounds. He may be the textbook case of a key opinion leader. Of course, I speak of Charles "Bling Bling" Nemeroff. Rather than list the many questionable at best behaviors he has exhibited, each of which has called into question his standing as a scientist as opposed to a blatant drug marketer, I just want to a) direct everyone to a detailed list of his speaking engagements from GlaxoSmithKline and b) discuss a month of living the High Life, Nemeroff Style.

As is well known by now (1, 2), Nemeroff appears to have not been particularly forthcoming about the huge amounts he was making while moonlighting for every drug company on the planet (see below) despite requirements that he do so. According to psychiatrist Danny Carlat:

From 2000 to 2006, GSK paid Nemeroff a total of $960,488. Note that this was not research grant money, or money for Emory's psychiatry department. These were fees that went into his personal bank account, which he earned by either sitting on GSK's Advisory Board, or speaking to doctors about GSK products. His typical fee for a talk was $3500 plus expenses, but sometimes he made more.

Of this $960,488, the total amount he disclosed to Emory [his employer, to whom he was required to report such income] was $34,998.

According to a GSK document hosted by Senator Charles Grassley, Nemeroff took in over $20 grand in one month from speaking engagements for GSK. Not bad work if you can get it, eh? And this month doesn't seem unusual for Nemeroff. These are only his speeches for GSK -- he also gave speeches for several other companies. The document goes on and on -- 39 pages of paid speech listings, nearly all of them featuring Nemeroff. I just picked 03-30-00 to 04-30-00 because they were on the first pages of the document, which covers expenses from 2000 to 2008 for Dr. Bling Bling.

Nemeroff GSK Honoraria from March 30, 2000 to April 30, 2000

Date	Speaking Fee
03/30/2000	$4000
04/12/2000	$2500
04/19/2000	$4000
04/20/2000	$4175 (includes some 'expenses'; I suspect $4000 was the speaking fee)
04/27/2000	$4000
04/30/2000	$2500
TOTAL	$21, 175 (probably $21,000 excluding travel expenses)

Imagine making $20k in a month for basically reading slides a few times that were quite possibly entirely written by a drug company. And many of these talks were accompanied by posh meals, the kind that myself and most of my readers might eat once or twice a year.

Here's a Nemeroff disclosure from a recent journal article:

Dr Nemeroff has received grants from or performed research for the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Forest Laboratories, Inc, Janssen Pharmaceutica, NARSAD: TheMental Health Research Association, the National Institute of Mental Health, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories; has been a consultant to Abbott Laboratories, Acadia Pharmaceuticals, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Corcept Therapeutics, Cypress Bioscience, Cyberonics, Eli Lilly and Co, Entrepreneur’s Fund, Forest Laboratories, Inc, GlaxoSmithKline, i3 DLN, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Lundbeck, Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Quintiles Transnational, UCB Pharma, and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories; has been on the speakers bureau for Abbott Laboratories, GlaxoSmithKline, Janssen Pharmaceutica, and Pfizer Pharmaceuticals; is a stockholder in Acadia Pharmaceuticals, Corcept Therapeutics, Cypress Bioscience, and NovaDel Pharma Inc; is on the board of directors of the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, the American Psychiatric Institute for Research and Education, the George West Mental Health Foundation, NovaDel Pharma Inc, and the National Foundation for Mental Health; holds patents on a method and devices for transdermal delivery of lithium (US 6,375,990 B1) and on a method to estimate serotonin and norepinephrine transporter occupancy after drug treatment using patient or animal serum (provisional filing April 2001); and holds equity in Reevax, BMC-JR LLC, and CeNeRx.

No, I didn't make that up. As Ed Silverman wrote at Pharmalot, "It also raises a question - when he did find time to do anything else?"

Prialt Pushed Through Duplicate Publication

Apparently, the same data on Elan's pain medication Prialt (ziconotide) was published twice. Same data set. No reference in the second publication to the first publication. As I noted last week in a post about Cymbalta, that's not supposed to happen. It's the sort of thing that leads physicians to believe that a medication has a lot of supporting evidence -- "Of course I prescribe it; I've seen two positive clinical trials" -- when in fact it's just the same data being repackaged in another journal. The full story is contained in two posts at The MacGuffin (1, 2). An infomercial passing off as continuing medical education is also involved in the plot. Count The MacGuffin as an official must-read blog.

Gabitril Goes Down

Gabitril (tiagabine) is an antiseizure medication from Cephalon, which just forked out a cool $425 million to settle charges that it marketed several drugs for unapproved conditions, including Provigil and Gabitril. Government investigators claimed that Gabitril was marketed as a treatment for anxiety, which is too bad considering that it struck out in three clinical trials against a placebo. Each study found no evidence that Gabitril was better than a sugar pill.

Gabitril was also allegedly marketed as a treatment for pain. I was unable to locate a single controlled study examining the efficacy of Gabitril for pain, though there were a small number of uncontrolled (i.e., not very useful) studies suggesting that maybe Gabitril could be used to treat pain. Regarding sleep, the placebo-controlled trials I located did not suggest that the drug was particularly effective (1, 2). So we're looking at a drug with essentially no controlled evidence of efficacy being pushed for pain, sleep, and anxiety. Well-done, Cephalon.

Some of the supporting evidence about the off-label marketing cases came from a sales rep who wore a wire to collect evidence on the company's marketing practices. Apparently a total of four company whistleblowers were involved. Shades of Peter Rost?

Read more about the case at the Philadelphia Inquirer.

PS. Cephalon published the negative anxiety Gabitril trials in June 2008. As is well-established, companies often fail to publish negative data about their products, so why is Cephalon being so open? A skeptic might note that with the legal case againt Cephalon gaining steam, it would look even worse if Cephalon was sitting on negative data. So perhaps knowing that bad publicity was coming due to the lawsuit led Cephalon to allow the negative anxiety results to be published, as they could state "Look at how open and honest we are." I'm just saying that it's a possibility.

Reference for anxiety trials:
Mark H. Pollack, Jane Tiller, Fang Xie, Madhukar H. Trivedi (2008). Tiagabine in Adult Patients With Generalized Anxiety Disorder Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 28 (3), 308-316 DOI: 10.1097/JCP.0b013e318172b45f

Update: Also read a related post at Health Care Renewal. It mainly discusses Cephalon's opiate-laced "perc-o-pops" (Actiq) approved to treat cancer pain, but marketed in a much broader manner.

Follow-up mini-rant: Let's not excuse the physicians who jumped on board. Docs need to do a much better job of checking the evidence base, though when some of the evidence base consists of publishing the same data repeatedly and when negative trials are often not published, what kind of "evidence base" are we really talking about?

The V-Squad Finale

Here is the final of the 3 training clips for Vioxx salespersons. The first and second clips are also available.

Be The Power:
2 efficacy
2 GI risk (and ZERO cardiovascular risk)

How 'bout a nice dose of data? Oh, this clip is SO rich!

More From the V-Squad

The Superhero team of Merck sales reps continued to work hard to push Vioxx. The ending of this clip is definitely a cliffhanger, so be sure to tune in for the finale tomorrow! See clip 1 in my most recent post.

Meet the V-Squad

How did Merck go about training reps to sell Vioxx? Here's part one of three. Thanks to an anonymous reader for sending me along this trilogy. Part 2 is great and part 3 is outrageously funny. Well, I mean except for the part (not included in the videos) where people were dropping dead from taking this newer, "safer" painkiller. Parts 2 and 3 coming soon.



Go to vioxxdocuments.com for more such goodies.

SSRI Doesn't Work? Try Zyprexa

...So said Lilly sales reps who pushed the drug in Alaska. I did a little reading on the topic from the new Zyprexa document set from the recent Alaska case, but was scooped by Furious Seasons, where it was written that:

Lilly was using cases of patients--apparently with bipolar disorder, likely type 2--who ran into problems on SSRIs such as agitation to create a scenario for selling doctors on using Zyprexa in these patients.

Snippets from sales call notes are then added to strongly support this assertion. Well worth a read. Especially the clincher that involves the old-fashioned trick of bribing docs with candy to get them to write Zyprexa scripts. If I get a little spare time, I hope to wrangle through the new Zyprexa docs and spread the word about whatever horrors lie therein.

Sowing the Seeds of Vioxx

A new article in the Annals of Internal Medicine lays bare how research was commandeered by marketing in the promotion of Vioxx, Merck’s former all-star painkiller and personkiller. The article is based on a chunk of internal Merck documents revealed during legal proceedings (not unlike the infamous Zyprexa documents). Merck set up the study known as ADVANTAGE, in which 2785 arthritis patients were given Vioxx and 2772 arthritis patients took naproxen. Physicians across the nation were recruited to enroll patients to participate in the study, which was intiated during the FDA approval process for Vioxx.

The study, however, was conceived and conducted by Merck’s marketing department. Why? As Vioxx was about to come to market, Merck needed to develop a need for their product. By hiring physicians to participate as “investigators” on this trial, Merck was exposing its product to an important group of potential customers. To quote Merck:

The objectives were to provide product trial among a key physician group to accelerate uptake of VIOXX as the second entrant in a highly competitive new class and gather data important to this customer group. The trial was designed and executed in the spirit of the Merck marketing principles.

Other snippets from a Merck marketing memo, with pithy commentary added free of charge:

• "...the trial was targeted to a select group of critical customers.” So the main qualification to be a “research investigator” in this trial was to be a customer that Merck wanted to win over.

• “The sales force nominated potential investigators and completed intake forms, allowing a very large number of sites to be evaluated and enrolled and ensuring equal distribution of investigators across the business groups.” Again, the sales force chose the physicians, apparently based on how easily they could be swayed to prescribe Vioxx as a result of participating in this study.

• “An analysis performed at 6 months post launch demonstrated a significantly higher level of prescribing for VIOXX among primary care ADVANTAGE investigators compared to a control group of VIOXX 99 prescribers (see attached). Feedback from the field has been overwhelmingly positive about their ability to access key customers and the influence that being involved in the trial has had on their perceptions of VIOXX and Merck.” The program apparently had its desired results – more docs prescribing Vioxx as a result of their participation in Merck marketing-designed “research.” As for the patients dying due to taking Vioxx, well, what’s a little collateral damage when there are quarterly sales goals to be met?

The name for such an exercise in marketing is a “seeding trial,” referring to a company planting seeds in physicians to use their product under the guise of research.

II. What about getting the results out?

According to Merck: “Preparations are now underway for analysis and publication of the data, which will utilize key investigators as authors and advisors.” Turns out that worked pretty well – as the lead author on the main ADVANTAGE publication told the New York Times that “Merck designed the trial, paid for the trial, ran the trial. Merck came to me after the study was completed and said, “We want your help to work on the paper. The initial paper was written at Merck, and then it was sent to me for editing.” – it was sent to him to place a veneer of academic credibility on Merck’s marketing-run trial.

Even Merck’s head of research said that trials such as ADVANTAGE are “intellectually redundant” – as they tend to focus on results that are already well-established, such as showing Vioxx to be somewhat easier on the gastrointestinal tract that naproxen.

Harold Sox and Drummond Rennie, also writing in the Annals of Internal Medicine, in a critique of Vioxx’s marketing wrote:

This practice—a seeding trial—is marketing in the guise of science. The apparent purpose is to test a hypothesis. The true purpose is to get physicians in the habit of prescribing a new drug. Why would a drug company go to the expense and bother of conducting a trial involving hundreds of practitioners— each recruiting a few patients—when a study based at a few large medical centers could accomplish the same scientific purposes much more efficiently? The main point of the seeding trial is not to get high-quality scientific information: It is to change the prescribing habits of large numbers of physicians. A secondary purpose is to transform physicians into advocates for the sponsor’s drug. The company flatters a physician by selecting him because he is “an opinion leader” and incorporates him in the research team with the title of “investigator.” Then, it pays him good money: a consulting fee to advise the company on the drug’s use and another fee for each patient he enrolls. The physician becomes invested in the drug’s future and praises its good features to patients and colleagues. Unwittingly, the physician joins the sponsor’s marketing team. Why do companies pursue this expensive tactic? Because it works.

This is hardly the biggest problem with Vioxx, as its tendency to kill people en masse via heart problems is obviously a far more important issue. And we all know at this point that Merck made sure to underplay the risks of Vioxx, and that the medical community was also asleep at the wheel when it came examining published studies on the risks of Vioxx. Nonetheless, using the guise of science to recruit naive (or greedy) physicians to serve as Vioxx pushers is contemptible.

Merck was out pushing how wonderfully safe and well-tolerated was via a “study” designed solely to turn “investigators” into top Vioxx prescribers, while at the same time, more and more people were meeting an early end due to this purportedly safe new drug.

For more hot Vioxx action, check out this site.

Update (8-19-08): Check out an interview with Dr. Kevin Hill, lead author of the investigation of the ADVANTAGE trial, over at the Carlat Psychiatry Blog. As always, Pharmalot also has a good post on the topic.

Zyprexa Marketing: We Don't Need No Stinkin' Diagnosis and Hiding Risks

From an excellent piece at Bloomberg:

"The doctor's thinking that he does not see a schizophrenic or bipolar patient,'' [Zyprexa brand manager] Bandick said in a December 2000 internal e- mail to the marketing department. "But he probably does see patients with symptoms of behavior, mood and thought disturbances,'' he wrote. "Even if the doctor does not have diagnosis, he should treat anyway.''

Adding more fuel to the fire I discussed in February 2007:

The document discussed in this post is called the “Zyprexa Primary Care Presentation”. It appears to be a transcript of a speech Mike Bandick, the Zyprexa Brand Manager, gave at the Eli Lilly National Sales Meeting on March 13, 2001.

It is important to note that Zyprexa is only FDA-approved for use in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. The document appears to indicate that Bandick was encouraging salespeople to market Zyprexa for treating more than just these two conditions.

Bandick said:

We intend, quite simply, to redefine the way PCPs treat mood, thought and behavioral disturbances. We will continue to focus on symptoms and behaviors that PCPs see every day.

Later he said, referencing Zyprexa:

Broad symptom efficacy in mood, thought, and behavioral disturbances.

It seems curious that Lilly states they did not market Zyprexa for off-label purposes, yet the term “Mood, thought, and behavioral disturbances” seems a fair amount broader than schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. In addition, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (especially bipolar I, which is the much more severe form of bipolar in comparison to bipolar II) are uncommon disorders. It is highly unlikely that primary care physicians would see patients with such conditions “every day.” However, it is certainly possible that a PCP may run across individuals who are manifesting much less severe “disturbances”, and it may well have been that it was this group, the patients who exhibited mild “mood, thought, or behavioral” symptoms, for whom Zyprexa was being marketed.

But don't worry -- Lilly will tell you that they don't promote off-label. Do keep in mind that I'm not singling out Lilly, as this kind of thing seems to be par for the course.

As for risks of Zyprexa, well, according to Bloomberg...

Lilly added a warning to its packaging in October 2007 saying that more than half of patients in 13 studies gained an average of 12 pounds after taking the drug for less than a year. It said Zyprexa was more associated with higher blood sugar levels, a risk factor for diabetes, than similar medications.

Before the October 2007 label change, Lilly didn't instruct its sales force to say Zyprexa's diabetes rates were higher, former marketing director David Noesges said in a January deposition.

"We will NOT proactively address the diabetes concern,'' the Zyprexa sales force was advised in 2002, the documents show. "The competition wins if we are distracted into talking about diabetes."

The Bloomberg article is a must-read.

Paxil, Lies, and the Lying Researchers Who Tell Them

A bombshell has just appeared in the International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine. The subject of the paper is Paxil study 329, which examined the effects of the antidepressant paroxetine in adolescents. The study findings were published in the Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry in 2001. These new findings show that I was wrong about Paxil Study 329. You know, the one that I said overstated the efficacy of Paxil and understated its risks. The one that I claimed was ghostwritten. Turns out that due to legal action, several documents were made available that shed more light on the study. The authors (Jureidini, McHenry, and Mansfield) of the new investigation have a few enlightening points. Let's look at the claims and you can then see how wrong I was, for which I sincerely apologize. The story is actually worse than I had imagined. Here's what I said then:

Article [quote from the study publication]: Paroxetine is generally well-tolerated and effective for major depression in adolescents (p. 762).

Data on effectiveness: On the primary outcome variables (Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression [HAM-D] mean change and HAM-D final score < 8 and/or improved by 50% or more), paroxetine was not statistically superior to placebo. On four of eight measures, paroxetine was superior to placebo. Note, however, that its superiority was always by a small to moderate (at best) margin. On the whole, the most accurate take is that paroxetine was either no better or slightly better than a placebo.

I went on to bemoan how the authors took differences either based on arbitrary cutoff scores or from measures that assessed something other than depression to make illegitimate claims that paroxetine was effective. Based upon newly available data from the study, here's what happened.

• The protocol for the study (i.e., the document laying out what was going to happen in the study) called for eight outcome measurements. To quote Jureidini et al: "There was no significant difference between the paroxetine and placebo groups on any of the eight pre-specified outcome measures." So I was wrong. Paxil was not better on 4 of 8 measures -- it was better on ZERO of eight measures. My sincerest apologies.
• Another quote from Jureidini and friends: "Overall four of the eight negative outcome measures specified in the protocol were replaced with four positive ones, many other negative measures having been tested and rejected along the way."

Let's break this thing down for a minute. The authors planned to look eight different ways for Paxil to beat placebo. They went zero for eight. So, rather than declaring defeat, the authors then went digging to find some way in which Paxil was better than a placebo. Devising various cutoff scores on various measures on which victory could be declared, as well as examining individual items from various measures rather than entire rating scales, the authors were able to grasp and pull out a couple of small victories. In the published version of the paper, there is no hint that such data dredging occurred. Change the endpoints until you find one that works out, then declare victory.

How About Safety?

I was incensed about the coverage of safety, particularly the magical writing that stated that a placebo can make you suicidal, but Paxil could not. I wrote:

It gets even more bizarre. Remember those 10 people who had serious adverse psychiatric events while taking paroxetine? Well, the researchers concluded that none of the adverse psychiatric events were caused by paroxetine. Interestingly, the one person who became “labile” [i.e., suicidal] on placebo – that event was attributed to placebo. In this magical study, a drug cannot make you suicidal but a placebo can. In a later document, Keller and colleagues said that “acute psychosocial stressors, medication noncompliance, and/or untreated comorbid disorders were judged by the investigators to account for the adverse effects in all 10 patients.” This sounds to me as if the investigators had concluded beforehand that paroxetine is incapable of making participants worse and they just had to drum up some other explanation as to why these serious events were occurring.

Turns out I missed a couple things. Based on looking at an internal document and doing some calculations, Jureidini et al. found that serious adverse events were significantly more likely to occur in patients taking paroxetine (12%) vs. placebo (2%). Likewise, adverse events requiring hospitalization were significantly disadvantageous to paroxetine (6.5% vs. 0%). Severe nervous system side effects -- same story (18% vs. 4.6%). The authors of Study 329 did not conduct analyses to see whether the aforementioned side effects occurred more commonly on drug vs. placebo.

Funny how they had time to dredge through every conceivable efficacy outcome but couldn't see whether the difference in severe adverse events was statistically significant.

One quote from the discussion section of the paper sums it all up:

There was no significant efficacy difference between paroxetine and placebo on the two primary outcomes or six secondary outcomes in the original protocol. At least 19 additional outcomes were tested. Study 329 was positive on 4 of 27 known outcomes (15%). There was a significantly higher rate of SAEs with paroxetine than with placebo. Consequently, study 329 was negative for efficacy and positive forharm.

But the authors concluded infamously that "Paroxetine is generally well-tolerated and effective for major depression in adolescents."

Enter Ghostwriters. Documentary evidence as shown on indicated that the first draft of the study was ghostwritten. This leaves two roles for the so-called academic authors of this paper:

• They were willing co-conspirators who committed scientific fraud.
• They were dupes, who dishonestly represented that they had a major role in the analysis of data and writing of the study, when in fact GSK operatives were working behind the scenes to manufacture these dubious results.

Remember, this study was published in 2001, and there has still been no apology for the fictional portrayal of its results, wherein a drug that was ineffective and unsafe was portrayed as safe and effective. Physicians who saw the authorship line likely thought "Gee, this is a who's who among academic child psychiatrists -- I can trust that they provided some oversight to make sure GSK didn't twist the results." But they were wrong.

By the way, Martin Keller, the lead "independent academic" author of this tragedy of a study said, when asked about what it means to be a key opinion leader in psychiatry:

You’re respected for being an honorable person and therefore when you give an opinion about something, people tend to listen and say – These individuals gave their opinions; it’s worth considering.

So is completely misrepresenting the data from a study "honorable"? Is Keller's opinion "worth considering?" As you know if you've read this blog for long, such behavior is, sadly, not a fluke occurrence. Many others who should be providing leadership are leading us on a race to the scientific and ethical bottom. What will Brown University, home of Keller, do? Universities don't seem to care at all about scientific fraud, provided that the perpetrators of bad science are bringing home the bacon.

Not one of the "key opinion leaders" who signed on as an author to this study has said, "Yep, I screwed up. I didn't see the data and I was a dupe." Nobody. Sure, I don't expect that every author of every publication can vouch for the data with 100% certainty. I understand that. But shouldn't the lead author be taking some accountability?

This is a Fluke (?) Some may be saying: "But this is just a fluke occurrence." Is it? I've seen much evidence that data are often selectively reported in a manner like this -- looks like (sadly) it takes a lawsuit for anyone to get a whiff of the bastardization of $science that passes for research these days. If GSK had not been sued, nobody would have ever known that the published data from Study 329 were negative. A reasonably educated person could see that the writeup of the study was a real pimp job -- lots of selling the product based on flimsy evidence, but nobody would have seen the extent of the fraud. Apparently lawyers need to police scientists because scientists are incapable of playing by some very basic rules of science.

See for Yourself. Documents upon which the latest Jureidini et al. paper are based can be found here. Happy digging.

Military Analysts and Key Opinion Leaders

As noted at the Carlat Psychiatry Blog, it sure is strange to see the similarities between "independent" military analysts and "independent" scientists/key opinion leaders. What do they both have in common? They both pass along talking points from an outside source, lending these marketing messages an air of independence and credibility. Check out the New York Times for the story on the military analysts. Check out this story on "independent scientists" and information laundering here for just one of many, many examples of scientists selling out.

And see the clip below for a few examples of military analysts bravely repeating talking points in the name of their Pentagon Masters, er, defense contractors, er, Patriotism and the Defense of Freedom.

Key Opinion Leaders, Osteoporosis, Vioxx, Psychiatry, Science, and Patients

Remember Richard Eastell? To summarize briefly, he is a professor at Sheffield University who was lead author on a publication that showed positive results for the osteoporosis drug Actonel. One problem: the data did not actually provide good news for Actonel. In a key graph in the published paper, 40% of patient data was missing. Now that's an interesting form of science: Just eliminate the pesky 40% of the data that don't go along with your hypothesis and POOF!, you get exactly the results you are looking for. An excellent writeup of the situation can be seen in Jennifer Washburn's excellent piece in Slate. Making the plot more interesting, Eastell did not have the raw data; Procter & Gamble's (Actonel's sponsor) statisticians were in charge of the analysis. Hence the missing 40% of the data, which helped to cast Actonel in a more positive light. Read more on the topic here. When all data are included, the analysis does not support Actonel's marketing points. Eastell signed off on the original (misleading) paper saying that he had seen all of the data, which was, of course not true.

I noted in October 2006 that Eastell was chairing a session on osteoporosis, one that charged a hefty registration fee. The website promoting the session at the time mentioned: "This course is suitable for pharmaceutical industry personnel from clinical through to marketing disciplines." I suppose that Eastell is a key opinion leader in his field. Being willing to put one's name on a paper where the key graph knocks out 40% of the data is a good step toward becoming an influential academic these days. I suppose Eastell could at least claim ignorance, since he was unfamiliar with the underlying data.

In psychiatry, Charles Nemeroff, a key opinion leader, put his name on a continuing medical education presentation in which the data don't match with the published article that was based on the same data set. In the CME presentation, the medication (risperidone) outperformed placebo, although the published report indicated that risperidone did not beat a placebo, and in the CME presentation, risperidone was claimed to improve sexual functioning, which was never mentioned in the published article.

Eastell and a colleague recently received a roughly $7.5 million grant. Good for them. I've got nothing against the guy personally; I just find it interesting that he is getting rewarded nicely despite the whole Actonel fiasco. And I've only described a wee bit of that strange saga. The Scientific Misconduct Blog has much, much more. Like the part where he told Blumsohn to stop bothering Procter & Gamble about the data because P & G was a good source of income for the university. I've got no problem with excellence being rewarded. Perhaps Eastell has done many excellent things. However, during the P &G/Actonel fiasco, Eastell was willing to let the sponsors push him around, even if science was being bastardized in the process. Their money meant more than good science. And if patients took Actonel thinking that it was more effective than it actually was, who cares -- they're not the ones providing the research funding, right?

Think about this for a second. Many people have been up in arms about the recently unveiled Vioxx ghostwriting scandal. For a fantastic take on the scandal, see Health Care Renewal or Hooked. Briefly, Merck and its associated medical writers wrote manuscripts that said nice things about Vioxx. Then academic authors/key opinion leaders were found to review the papers and stick their names on as lead authors. Mind you, "reviewing" the papers often meant simply meant making minimal edits, if even putting in that much effort. Did they see the data? They saw tables and figures provided by Merck, but did they see the raw data? In most cases, apparently not. Doesn't that make them information launderers? They take industry data, and clean it up with their academic reputation. Oh, Dr. So-and-So is at Sheffield or Emory or Harvard... -- he must have made sure that the sponsoring drug company is portraying the data accurately. A veneer of credibility. And an extra publication for the key opinion leader, which makes the KOL that much more important in the academic world where publication envy runs rampant.

This system is not exactly set up to benefit patient outcomes, is it?

Key Opinion Leader Is Unfairly Disparaged

Or so she said. I've written about key opinion leader, University of Cincinnati child psychiatrist Melissa DelBello a few times (here, here, and here). One key point was she was quoted as saying "Trust me. I don't make much" in regards to income received from AstraZeneca for giving favorable talks for its antipsychotic drug Seroquel. I had missed that in 2007, she claimed she was misquoted in an interesting piece on Inside Higher Ed:

[University of Cincinnati spokesperspon] Puff said that DelBello’s comment in May that she did not “make much” money from drug companies had actually come in response to the reporter’s question “about how much money she was given for making a single, individual presentation. Her comment was misrepresented and then repeated by Sen. Grassley.” Added DelBello: “I was and have been misquoted by the NYT.” (The Times reporter, Gardiner Harris, could not be reached Sunday to respond to the suggestion that he had misrepresented DelBello’s comment.)

Puff also said that “the implication of what Sen. Grassley said was that she was disingenuous in what she was paid. She has been completely open in disclosing her payments. She’s made complete disclosures to the university and its IRB. Furthermore, she’s made full disclosure to the Senate Finance Committee.... Additionally, Dr. DelBello has disclosed her funding at all speaking engagements and she’s disclosed in the patient consents of her studies.”

I wonder if she has made disclosures about her company (MSZ Associates) that Senator's Grassley's investigation claims was set up for "personal financial reasons"and well-funded by AstraZeneca. Also, does the above mean that DelBello disclosed that she has personally received hundreds of thousands of dollars from AstraZeneca and other sources in the consent forms for her studies? I have to admit I'm pretty skeptical about that, but I could be wrong. As far as full disclosure to the Senate, Grassley's most recent findings seem to contradict this claim. Hey, maybe Grassley is just making things up, so either DelBello is being unfairly persecuted or her story is simply not adding up.

Why am I making such a big deal about this? Well, such a gigantic hidden conflict of interest doesn't exactly engender my faith, and DelBello is a person who can take at least responsibility for the widespread treatment of children with antipsychotic medications. Due to her research findings that some claim support the use of antipsychotics in kids and her many marketing speeches for AstraZeneca and others, the landscape for badly behaving children is changing, and likely not for the better (1, 2, 3).

Pharmalot reports that the University of Cincinnati is unresponsive to his requests for comment. Perhaps they're going for the time-honored tradition of remaining in silence under the belief that this publicity cannot possibly last much longer.

Zyprexa and Key Opinion Leaders

Since the Zyprexa trial is ongoing in Alaska, I thought I should return to the wonderful world of Zyprexa. I encourage readers to follow the Zyprexa coverage at Furious Seasons, Pharmalot, and PharmaGossip. Today, I will discuss the link between key opinion leaders and the marketing of Zyprexa. To preface, a coveted Golden Goblet Nomination could be handed out to several individuals based on their involvement in Zyprexa marketing...

In March 2000, Zyprexa received FDA approval for treatment of manic episodes. One document laid out the multipronged marketing maneuvers that Lilly utilized to move Zyprexa shortly after its approval. Some of the details of this document have been well-covered in a terrific piece of investigative journalism at Furious Seasons. This post will provide some coverage of the link between Zyprexa and the key opinion leaders who helped popularize the drug across the nation.

Once approved for bipolar disorder, Lilly utilized several tactics to market Zyprexa for bipolar disorder, including a satellite conference beamed to about 6000 physicians, and 8000 treatment team members in 1000 facilities. The faculty providing this educational service included many of the big names in academic psychiatry, including Paul Keck, Jan Fawcett, Hagop Akiskal, and Alan Schatzberg.

Alan Schatzberg, you say? Yes, the same Alan Schatzberg who is set to become president of the American Psychiatric Association. Some have been less than pleased with his election as APA president, considering his background as a physician-marketer, a key opinion leader with large conflicts of interest. The same Alan Schatzberg who has been involved in marketing passing itself off as continuing medical education.

Lilly also bankrolled dinner meetings, anticipated to draw 150-400 physicians per sitting. Dr. Schatzberg was also listed as a speaker for such dinners. One mental health service provider was impressed enough with receiving such excellent medical education that you can find it on his CV.

In the document outlining Zypexa's big marketing launch, Paul Keck's name appears in the following contexts:

• Satellite symposium provider
• Trainer of "local speakers." I believe this means he would train local physicians in various markets to then discuss Zyprexa with their colleagues.
• Faculty for bipolar weekend symposia
• Faculty for audio conferences
  
• Faculty for a satellite CME workshop
• Faculty for "dissemination of Bipolar information to 30,000 customers"
• Faculty on a "closed symposium" resulting in a CME newsletter and a CME audiotape, both of which were mailed to 30,000 individuals
• Author of two journal supplement articles

Paul Keck was also a member of a task force chartered by the American Psychiatric Association that served to revise the organization's guidelines to provide a more favorable view of atypical antipsychotics (including Zyprexa) in the treatment of bipolar disorder. No conflict of interest there, eh?

Keck said in a 2002 interview that:

"Often," Keck said, "patients with bipolar disorder require complex treatment regimens to manage all phases of their illness, creating a compliance challenge for patients and a management challenge for clinicians. These studies suggest that physicians may be able to use olanzapine as a foundation to simplify patients’ treatment regimens, and the combination of olanzapine and fluoxetine could be an effective treatment choice

It is likely that Keck was not performing all of his "educational" functions for Lilly in exchange for lollipops. He was likely receiving a healthy dose of cold, hard cash. Yet in the article, nothing is written about his financial links to Lilly. Keck has also appeared in press releases saying nice things about Symbyax (fluoxetine/olanzapine combination).

To be fair, Keck has also stumped for Pfizer's Geodon in press releases. Oh, and he also said nice things about Abilify in a press release. I suppose that if one is going to be a true key opinion leader, a real mover and shaker, one should be prepared to say nice things about whatever new drug is released, since each new drug naturally represents an "important" treatment option. Keck, like Alan Schatzberg and Charles Nemeroff, is also currently listed as a member of the clinical advisory board for Neuroscience CME, a for-profit entity awash in drug industry money. Dr. Daniel Carlat has previously written that the "educational" content produced by this organization is biased, and I find that easy to believe. It's not hard to find examples of poorly done industry-funded CME. In fact, you might be interested in reading about a CME activity in which Nemeroff seems to have pulled data out of thin air.

In sum, the usual fun and games were in play when Zyprexa was initially being pushed for bipolar disorder. Some of the biggest names in psychiatry left their fingerprints all over the marketing of Zyprexa and one of these key opinion leaders recently won the presidential election for the American Psychiatric Association. I suppose, then, that American psychiatrists are generally either unaware of conflicts of interest or don't care about them.

The beautiful thing about being a key opinion leader is that one's name recognition is huge. Among psychiatrists, I bet that Schatzberg's name is better known than that of Bill Clinton, since Schatzberg's byline appears on journal supplements and CME so frequently. That can't hurt when running for president of the national professional organization. I will be very interested to see how Schatzberg handles questions about conflicts of interest and drug industry influence on his profession. Don't be expecting any major efforts at reform in the near future.

Effexor Beats SSRIs (Kind of, Sort of, In a maybe meaningless way...)

A recent study in the journal Biological Psychiatry claimed to show that Effexor's (venlafaxine's) alleged advantages over SSRIs "may be of public health relevance." Unstated in the article, but a more accurate reading of their findings, is that antidepressants yield little benefit over a placebo. I'm breaking this into two parts. The current post deals with the authors' claims regarding venlafaxine's superiority over SSRIs. A second post will examine their understated finding that antidepressants are not particularly impressive compared to placebo.

The study was a meta-analysis, where data from all clinical trials comparing Effexor to an SSRI were pooled together. The authors used remission on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HAM-D) as their measure of treatment effectiveness. On the HAM-D, a score of less than or equal to 7 was used to define remission. They found that remission rates on Effexor were 5.9% greater than remission rates on SSRIs. Thus, one would need to treat 17 depressed patients with Effexor rather than an SSRI to yield one remission that would not have occurred had all 17 patients received an SSRI. Not a big difference, you say? Here's what the authors said:

...the pooled effect size across all comparisons of venlafaxine versus SSRIs reflected an average difference in remission rates of 5.9%, which reflected a NNT of 17 (1/.059), that is, one would expect to treat approximately 17 patients with venlafaxine to see one more success than if all had been treated with another SSRI. Although this difference was reliable and would be important if applied to populations of depressed patients, it is also true that it is modest and might not be noticed by busy clinicians in everyday practice. Nonetheless, an NNT of 17 may be of public health relevance given the large number of patients treated for depression and the significant burden of illness associated with this disorder. [my emphasis]

Public Health Relevance/Remission: The public health claim is pretty far over the top. If one had to treat 17 patients with Effexor to prevent a suicide or homicide that would have occurred had SSRIs been used, then yes, we'd be talking about a significant impact on public health. But that's not what we're dealing with in this study. The outcome variable was remission on the HAM-D, which is a soft, squishy measure of convenience. The authors state that remission rates are "the most rigorous measure of antidepressant efficacy," but to my knowledge there is no evidence supporting their adoption of the magic cutoff score of 7 on the HAM-D as the definition for depressed/not depressed. Are people who scored 8 or 9 on the HAM-D really significantly more depressed than people who scored 6 or 7? Take a look at the HAM-D yourself and make your own decision. I know of not a single piece of empirical data stating that such small differences are meaningful. So I'm not buying the public health benefit -- in fact, I think it is patently ridiculous.

Outcome measures can be either categorical (e.g., remission or no remission) or continuous (e.g., change on HAM-D scores from pretest to posttest). Joanna Moncrieff and Irving Kirsch discuss how using cut-off scores (categorical measures) rather than looking at mean change (continuous measures) can result in the categorical measure making the treatment appear much more effective than examination of continuous measures. Applied to this case, one wonders why the data on mean improvement was not provided. One can make a very weak case that Effexor works better than SSRIs based on an arbitrary categorical measure but not one shred of data was presented to show superiority on a continuous measure. If the data supported Effexor on both categorical and continuous measures, then I'd bet they would have been discussed in this article, as it was funded by Wyeth (patent holder for Effexor). Thus, the absence of data on continuous measures (e.g., difference in mean improvement on the HAM-D between Effexor-treated patients and SSRI-treated patients), is suspicious.

Even if the authors decided to use only categorical measures, it would have been nice had they opted to use multiple measures. They could have used the equally arbitrary 50% improvement criterion (HAM-D scores drop by 50% during treatment), for example. However, such data were not provided. So the authors decided to use one highly arbitrary measure, on which they found a very small benefit for venflafaxine over placebo. Whoopee.

I received an email from a respected psychiatrist (who shall remain anonymous) about this study. He/she opined:

...it would have been interesting if the authors had used other cutoffs for the Hamilton scale besides 7 to define remission; i.e., if they had done a sensitivity analysis. Apparently, Wyeth has all the raw data from the studies, so a lot of interesting science could be done with this very large aggregate database. For example, there are robust factor analyses of the Hamilton scale that indicate reasonably independent dimensions of depressed mood, agitation/anxiety, diurnal variation, etc., and it would be of great interest to determine the relative effects of the various drugs on these different illness dimensions

In other words, the authors could have attempted to see if there were meaningful differences between Effexor and SSRIs on important variables, yet they opted to not undertake such analysis. A skeptical view is that they analyzed the data in such a fashion, found nothing, and thus just reported the "good news" about Effexor. I don't know if they conducted additional analyses that were not reported. However, it would seem to me that someone at Wyeth would have run such analyses at some point, perhaps as part of this meta-analysis, because any advantage over SSRIs would make for excellent marketing copy. In fact, Effexor has been running the "better than SSRIs" line for years, based on rather scant data. If there were more impressive data, they would have been reported by now.

Prozac and the Rest: The findings showed that Effexor was only superior to a statistically significant degree (i.e., we'd not expect such differences by chance alone) when compared to Prozac (fluoxetine). The authors, to their credit, pointed this out on multiple occasions. However, their reporting seems a little contradictory when, on one hand, they report that venlafaxine was superior to SSRIs as a class (see quote toward the top of the post), but then note that the differences were only statistically significant when compared to Prozac. The percentage difference in remission favoring Effexor over Zoloft (sertraline) was 3.4%, over Paxil (paroxetine) was 4.6%, Celexa (citalopram) was 3.9%, and Luvox (fluvoxamine) was 14.1%. I think just about anyone would concur that the difference versus fluvoxamine seems too high to be credible, and it was based on only one study, making the fluke factor more tenable. Again, the advantage of Effexor over all SSRIs except Prozac was not statistically significant. Even if these differences were statistically significant, would the authors claim that needing to treat 26 patients with Effexor rather than Celexa to achieve one additional depression remission would improve public health? Small differences on a soft, squishy, arbitrary endpoint combined with not performing (or not reporting) more meaningful data = Not news.

The Editor Piles On: In a press release, the editor of the journal in which this article appears jumped on board in a big way:

Acknowledging the seemingly small advantage, John H. Krystal, M.D., Editor of Biological Psychiatry and affiliated with both Yale University School of Medicine and the VA Connecticut Healthcare System, comments that this article “highlights an advance that may have more importance for public health than for individual doctors and patients.” He explains this reasoning:

"If the average doctor was actively treating 200 symptomatic depressed patients and switched all of them to venlafaxine from SSRI, only 12 patients would be predicted to benefit from the switch. This signal of benefit might be very hard for that doctor to detect. But imagine that the entire population of depressed patients in the United States, estimated to be 7.1% of the population or over 21 million people, received a treatment that was 5.9% more effective, then it is conceivable that more than 1 million people would respond to venlafaxine who would not have responded to an SSRI. This may be an example of where optimal use of existing medications may improve public health even when it might not make much difference for individual doctors and patients."

Seeing a journal editor swallow the Kool-Aid is not encouraging. Again, the 5.9% difference is based on an endpoint that may well mean nothing.

Ghostwriter Watch: Who wrote the study and who conducted the analyses? The authors are listed as Charles Nemeroff, Richard Entsuah, Isma Benattia, Mark Demitrack, Diane Sloan, and Michael Thase. Their respective contributions are not listed in the text of the article. The contribution of Wilfrido Ortega-Leon for assistance with statistical analysis is acknowledged in the article, as are the contributions of Sherri Jones and Lorraine Sweeney of Advogent for "editorial assistance."

Ortega-Leon appears to be an employee of Wyeth. So did an employee of Wyeth run all of the stats, then pass them along to the authors for writeup? Last time I checked, there were sometimes problems associated with having a company-funded statistician run the stats then pass them along without any independent oversight. I don't know what happened, but my questions could have been easily resolved: Describe each author's contributions in a note at the end of the article.

Sherri Jones and Lorraine Sweeney have served in an "editorial assistant" role for other studies promoting Effexor, such as this one. I suspect that they are familiar with the key marketing messages for the drug. An important question: What does "editorial assistance" mean? Did Jones and Sweeney simply spell-check the paper and make sure the figures looked pretty? Did they consult the authors to get the main points, then fill in a few gaps? Or did they write the whole paper then watch the purported authors rubber-stamp their names on the author byline? Simply listing "editorial assistance" is not transparency. I have no problem with medical writers helping with a manuscript, depending on what "helping" means. Many researchers are not skilled writers and cleaning up their writing is a good idea for all parties. But having a medical writer who is paid by a drug company to make sure that key marketing messages are included in the paper can lead to problems.

Part 2, regarding the unemphasized, but important, finding from this study that antidepressants yield mediocre benefits over placebo.

Update (03-03-08): See comments. A wise reader has pointed out that there are actually three authors from Advogent. Well, um, one author and two editorial assistants. A skeptical person would add that the presence of three medical writers and a Wyeth statistican who appears in a footnote at the end of the study obviates the need for those pesky academic authors except for the need to lend the study a stamp of approval from "independent scientists." Is that too cynical?